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Abstract 
 The impact of announcements of large-scale purchases of  government bonds on real 
GDP and the CPI in the United Kingdom and the United States is explored with a 
Bayesian VAR, estimated on monthly data from 2009M3 to 2014M5. Four different 
identification schemes are used, all leaving the reactions of  GDP and CPI unrestricted, 
and the transmission channels of the policy are examined. An asset purchase 
announcement of 1% of GDP leads to a statistically significant rise of .58% (.25%) and 
.62% (.32%) rise in real GDP and CPI for the US (UK). The transmission channels differ 
in the two countries.  
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1 Introduction 
In response to the 2008-9 financial crisis, both the Bank of England and the Federal 
Reserve undertook large-scale asset purchases (LSAP), buying  government debt as a 
means of providing monetary stimulus once interest rates were reduced as far as deemed 
possible.. A number of academic studies have examined the effects of this unconventional 
policy. For example Chung et al. (2012) used the Federal Reserve Board’s macroeconomic 
model to show that real GDP and inflation were respectively three and one percent 
higher as a result of US LSAPs. Kapetanios et al. (2012) used a range of BVAR methods to 
explore the effects of the Bank of England’s purchases, finding that GDP and CPI were 
raised by 2.5% and 1.5% as a result of the first round of asset purchases in the UK.  
This paper takes previous work on asset purchases in four new directions. First, in 
contrast to most existing studies,  three  mechanisms are explored through which asset 
purchases may influence output and prices. Secondly, the passage of time, together with 
use of monthly data, allows us to estimate our model using only data since March 2009 
when the policy was first introduced. This makes our results less susceptible to bias from 
the introduction of the new policy regime, and hence the Lucas Critique and structural 
breaks, than any other empirical study of this issue. We also explore whether our results 
are materially affected if the acute phase of the crisis, in 2009, is omitted from our data.  
Thirdly, effects found in VAR-based studies (e.g. Kapetanios et al. (2012)) were identified 
on the assumption that asset purchases led to a rise in real GDP and CPI only through 
their impact on the long-term interest rate. Here, instead, four different identification 
schemes are used  to identify asset purchase shocks. All of these leave both the 
transmission mechanism and the responses of real GDP and CPI unrestricted. The  
possibility implied by Eggertson and Woodford (2003) that, except as a result of signaling 
the future path of  short-term rates,  asset purchases have no impact on GDP or CPI is 
therefore not excluded.  Finally, all existing VAR studies rely on the imposition of either 
Litterman (1986) or time-varying parameter priors. Our analysis is carried out using a 
non-informative normal  inverse-Wishart prior, avoiding possible bias from priors that 
are set too tightly to let the data speak.  
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Theoretically, asset purchases might affect demand through three different 
mechanisms. The first is the so-called portfolio balance channel (Vayanos and Villa, 
2009). This relies on the presence of investors with a preferred habitat for a given 
maturity in the government bond market. If this is the case, purchases of long-term 
government debt have the effect of reducing yields on debt of the maturities purchased, 
through their impact on term premia. An alternative mechanism is the signaling channel- 
the idea that purchases signal that the policy interest rate will remain at its effective 
lower bound for longer. This was originally suggested by Eggertson and Woodford (2003) 
and  Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004). Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2011) 
found little evidence to support it but Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) suggested that rather 
stronger signaling  effects were present. A third possible mechanism is that asset 
purchases help to manage expectations about future economic outcomes and hence 
reduce economic uncertainty .1 All of these channels might lead to wealth effects from 
higher asset prices and raise consumption and investment. 
Our modeling framework allows us to explore which mechanisms may play a role by 
including relevant variables in the VAR one-by-one. If the portfolio balance (signaling) 
mechanism is behind the reduction in government bond yields, one should observe a 
relatively greater reaction of government debt yields (interest rate futures) at longer 
(shorter) maturities. Inclusion of yields at both maturities makes it possible to establish 
whether either mechanism is relevant. Further, inclusion of the VIX and a weighted 
average of implied interest rate futures’ volatilities (MOVE) make it possible to examine 
the impact on uncertainty and risk-taking.  
We find that an asset purchase anouncement shock worth 1% of nominal GDP, leads 
to a peak impact of about .62% (.25%) of real GDP and .58% (.32%) in CPI in the US 
(UK).  Conditional forecast exercises, the method of choice for calculating the total 
impact of QE1 in Baumeister and Benati (2013) and Kapetanios et al. (2012), suggest a 
total GDP and CPI impact broadly similar to that found by scaling up the peak impacts 
                                                 
1
 This is in line with Woodford (2003), who argues that the main transmission mechanism of 
modern monetary policy is through management of expectations about inflations and real 
GDP growth. 
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derived from the impulse response analysis.  The overall real GDP and CPI impact of QE1 
obtained with our approach is generally only slightly higher than Baumeister and Benati 
(2013) and Kapetanios et al (2012) for their US and UK real GDP and CPI responses to 
spread shocks, despite allowing for more transmission channels. But there is one notable 
exception: for the UK, our results suggest that the impact on the CPI is almost three times 
as large as the effect reported in these studies. The implied UK inflation-output trade-off 
is larger than in the US, meaning that the same change in GDP would have a greater 
impact on UK inflation. These estimates are, nevertheless, in line with studies of 
conventional monetary policy for the UK and  the US. 
 In terms of the transmission mechanism, our study suggests  that US asset 
purchases influence yields on medium and long-term government debt, but not interest 
rate futures, which implies a role for the portfolio rebalancing, rather than the signaling, 
channel. In contrast, UK purchases do not have clear impacts on either interest rate 
futures or long rates. In both countries there is evidence that announcements have the 
effect of reducing measures of financial market and household uncertainty.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section two explains our model and 
discusses the details of our identification schemes. Section three presents the results and 
section four concludes. 
2 Methodology and data 
We use the following VAR model estimated on monthly data: 
 𝒀𝒕 = 𝜶𝒄 + ∑ 𝑨𝒌𝒀𝒕−𝒌
𝑳
𝒌=𝟏 + 𝒆𝒕     𝒆𝒕~𝑵(𝟎, 𝜮)                     (1)              
where  𝒀𝒕  is a vector of the following endogenous variables: the announcement of asset 
purchases divided by nominal GDP; the log of CPI; the log of real GDP; the yield on the 
10-year government bond and the log of real equity prices at time t.  𝑨𝒌 is the array of 
coefficients associated with the corresponding lagged vector of variables for lag k.  𝒆𝒕 is a 
vector of residuals at time t. This is assumed to be normally distributed with variance-
covariance matrix 𝜮.  When the time-series dimension is small, estimates of 𝑨𝒌 are likely 
to be imprecise. Previous work has addressed this problem by relying on Bayesian 
methods of inference and imposing a Litterman (1986), or time-varying parameter, prior. 
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But there is always the risk that tight priors dominate information from the data. Our 
approach avoids this problem. The model is estimated with a non-informative normal 
inverse-Wishart prior, as2 in Uhlig (2005) and a lag length, L, of two throughout.3  
2.1 Identification 
The challenge for structural VAR models is to disentangle orthogonal, structural 
economic shocks, 𝜺𝒄,𝒕,, from the correlated reduced form shocks 𝒆𝒄,𝒕.  This is typically 
achieved using a matrix 𝑪𝟎,  such that 𝑪𝟎𝒆𝒄,𝒕 = 𝜺𝒄,𝒕.  We use four ways of inferring 𝑪𝟎, 
zero restrictions, sign restrictions, a combination of zero and sign restrictions,  and  
finally sign variance decomposition restrictions. All of these identification schemes are 
described in table 1. 
Identification scheme I uses a lower-triangular scheme, with asset purchases 
ordered after real GDP and prices, but before all of the other variables. The identifying 
assumptions are therefore that output and prices react with a lag and that aside from 
responding to these two, asset purchases do not react to any other variable upon impact.  
VAR identification schemes that employ timing exclusion restrictions have been 
criticised in recent years, on the grounds that such restrictions do not naturally emerge 
from DSGE models. Canova and De Nicolo (2002), Faust and Rogers (2003) and Uhlig 
(2005) have therefore proposed identifying shocks by means of the implied signs of the 
impulse responses that they produce. Clearly, for identification restrictions of this type to 
                                                 
2Jarocinski and Marcet (2013) propose imposing priors on the growth rates of variables, as 
opposed to priors on parameters, as the least controversial way to impose priors in small 
sample VARs. But it is unclear how to choose suitable priors for variables in our VAR 
such as real GDP, CPI or asset purchase announcements during this turbulent period of 
time.  That is why it seemed better to use the  normal inverse-Wishart prior, with 
hyperparameters set to small values to ensure that the prior is non-informative  (Uhlig, 
2005). See appendix D of his paper for more information.  
3 Ex ante lag length tests such as the Hannan-Quinn or BIC criterion suggest a lag length 
of 2.  When our model was estimated with six lags, it was, as a result of the short time-
series, necessary to use a Litterman (1986) prior, with the hyper-parameters estimated 
from the data following the approach in Giannone, Lenza and Primiceri (2015). This 
suggests that a 1%  US (UK) asset purchase announcement leads to a peak impact of .53 
(.23) and .61(.37) on real GDP and CPI, respectively. These values are almost identical to 
those  found with two lags and described in section 3.1.  
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be valid, they need to be strongly supported by economic theory. In the presence of 
financial frictions, such as  imperfect substitutability between long and short bonds 
(Harrison, 2012) or preferred habitat investors (Vayanos and Villa, 2009), economic 
theory does suggest that a rise in asset purchases will lead to a fall in the interest rate on 
long-term bonds, by reducing term premia. But even in the absence of frictions, 
announcements of asset purchases can signal that the short-term interest rate is going to 
stay lower for longer (Eggertson and Woodford, 2003), depressing the long rate. Secondly, 
lower yields on longer maturity bonds are likely to lead to some reallocation towards 
other assets, such as equities, generating a rise in real equity prices. Thus our definition of 
an asset purchase shock is that it leads to lower long-term rates and higher equity prices.  
The other shocks that we identify are an aggregate demand shock, which would 
typically lead to a rise in prices and output. The rise in prices, together with the fact that 
firms may require greater finance for production, is likely to lead to a non-negative 
response of the long interest rate. The rise in demand would also lead in expected profits 
and thus to a rise in real equity prices. The sign restrictions used to identify an aggregate 
supply shock are identical, other than assuming that prices fall rather than rise. This 
identification scheme,  referred to as scheme II throughout the paper, is summarised in 
Table 1 and implemented with the QR approach presented in Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner 
and Zha (2010). Unless otherwise noted, all sign restrictions are imposed upon impact and 
one month thereafter with the exception of asset purchase announcements, where the 
sign restriction is imposed upon impact and for five months thereafter here and also in 
identification schemes III and IV. 
In identification scheme II, the assumption is that asset purchases affect the real 
economy via portfolio rebalancing from long-term government bonds into equities, to 
distinguish them from aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks. But a priori it is 
not clear to what extent the mechanisms that are required for asset purchases to affect the 
yield on long-term government debt operate in reality. More importantly, to distinguish 
asset purchase from aggregate supply shocks, it is necessary to assume that long-term 
interest rates rise in response to an aggregate supply shock. Theoretically, a positive 
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aggregate supply shock may lead to a rise in investment, competition for funds and higher 
bond yields, but also a decline in bond yields as a result of the monetary policy reaction to 
lower consumer prices. Empirically, Dedola and Neri (2007) and Peersman and Straub 
(2009) examine the reaction of the short-term interest rate in response to technology 
shocks in SVARs for the US and Euro Area, respectively. Peersman and Straub (2009) 
show a positive medium-term reaction of the short rate to technology shocks, while 
Dedola and Neri (2007) find no significant effect. While the long rate restrictions are thus 
consistent with their results, we nevertheless drop them in identification scheme III 
below.  
This is possible, as long as one is willing to make the assumption that asset 
purchases do not react contemporaneously to aggregate demand and aggregate supply 
shocks. In that case, the restriction on real equity prices is sufficient to distinguish these 
shocks from asset purchases. Given that monetary policy makers do not observe aggregate 
demand or supply shocks within a month, the assumption of a zero contemporaneous 
reaction of asset purchases to aggregate demand and supply shocks is realistic. An 
additional advantage is that this allows us to identify a fourth shock, namely a rise in 
uncertainty/risk premia. This shock is identified as a decline in real equity prices, to 
which the monetary policy authority reacts with a rise in asset purchases, perhaps as a 
result of a coincident financial crisis. Unlike demand and supply, these types of shocks 
can be observed in real time. This identification scheme is referred to as identification 
scheme III throughout.  It is implemented using the procedure in Arias, Rubio-Ramirez 
and Waggoner (2014), who generalise the standard QR restrictions algorithm to include 
zero restrictions as well. Ours is, of course,  not the only paper to use a combination of 
zero and sign restrictions to identify unconventional monetary policy shocks.  
Gambarcorta, Hofmann and Peersman (2014) adopt a similar approach.  
Identification schemes I – III rely on the idea that shocks can be distinguished 
based on restrictions on impulse responses. But it is also possible to use variance 
decomposition restrictions to separate different economic shocks (Faust and Rogers, 2003; 
Uhlig, 2005). The idea here is that a shock that is variable-specific shocks should explain 
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the largest fraction of the variance in that variable.4 In identification scheme IV, asset 
purchase announcement shocks are assumed to explain the largest fraction of variation in 
asset purchases upon impact and with a three period delay. This makes it possible to drop 
the zero restrictions and also the sign restrictions on real equity prices. This scheme is 
implemented in a fashion similar to identification scheme II, with the QR approach by 
Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha (2010), but rather than keeping impulse responses 
which are consistent with a particular sign, only  those consistent with the variance 
decomposition restrictions in table 1 are retained.  
At present the theory underlying asset purchases is not sufficiently well 
understood to devise an identification scheme which would allow us to identify asset 
purchase announcement shocks perfectly. It is for this reason that we sequentially relax 
the strongest identification restrictions from the first scheme to the last one.  Despite this 
pecking order, it is nevertheless not possible to claim that one scheme is necessarily better 
identified or preferable to another. As a result we study the effects of asset purchases in 
all four cases paying particular attention to results which are significant with at least 
three of the four schemes adopted in this paper. 
TABLE 1 HERE PLEASE 
2.2 Data 
All of the VAR models in this paper are estimated on monthly data for the period 
when asset purchases were an active policy tool in both the UK and the US, from 2009m3 
to 2014m5. Monthly real GDP data for the UK are provided by the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research (Mitchell, Smith, Weale, Wright and Salazar, 2005), while 
monthly real GDP data for the US are taken from Macroeconomic Advisers.   
The monthly indices of consumer prices are the official measures. UK Value 
Added Tax, an important fiscal contributor to CPI movements, was reduced from 17.5 per 
cent to 15 per cent in January 2009, raised to 17.5 per cent in January 2010 and raised 
further to 20 per cent in January 2011. Use of the official CPIY monthly index makes it 
                                                 
4 Our approach is similar in spirit, but not technique, to the penalty function approach 
first proposed in Uhlig (2005).  
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possible to avoid the distortions this introduces. CPIY excludes the immediate effects of 
changes to indirect taxes. For the United States the variable used is the consumer price 
index published by the Bureau of Labour Statistics. Real equity prices are calculated by 
obtaining monthly averages of daily data for the FTSE100 and S&P500 obtained from 
Thomson DataStream and deflating by CPIY and CPI, respectively.  
The asset purchase announcement series are constructed in the following manner: 
For the UK, asset purchase announcements are simply cumulated over time. For the US, 
we treat asset purchases associated with the maturity extension program (Operation 
Twist) as additional asset purchases, attaching the same weight to them as asset purchase 
announcements of government bonds financed with the issue of central bank reserves. 
The effect of giving them a smaller weight is explored in section 3.4. The asset purchase 
series  are shown in figure 1 below. Unlike the UK, the US also announced open-ended 
asset purchases. The effects of these are also explored further in section 3.4. The series for 
UK asset purchase announcements are computed from the published Minutes of the 
Monetary Policy Committee. For the US, these data are taken from Federal Reserve Board 
anouncements.  
FIGURE 1 HERE PLEASE 
In order to explore the three possible transmission mechanisms it is necessary to 
study the impact, if any, of asset purchases on other variables. If the portfolio balance 
channel is the main transmission channel, one would expect a relatively large impact on 
the yields of twenty and thirty-year government bonds. The signaling mechanism, on the 
other hand, implies a relatively stronger reaction of the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) 
futures of the three-month interest rate, six months, one year and two years ahead. We 
also examine the impact of our identified asset purchase shocks on two financial market 
indicators of uncertainty: the VIX (implied stock market volatility) and the MOVE 
(weighted average of implied interest rate volatilities at different horizons). To tease out 
whether movements in these variables reflect economic uncertainty or investors’ risk 
appetite, we also look at a survey measure of household uncertainty and the BBB-AAA 
corporate bond spread. Details of the data are provided in online appendix E. 
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3 Results 
This section describes our main results. It compares them with earlier work which has 
studied asset purchases through the impact on the yield curve. The transmission 
mechanism and the robustness of our findings are also explored.  
3.1 Main results 
Figures 2A and 2B show the results for both countries for each of our four 
identification schemes, with the row labels indicating the scheme in question.  
FIGURE 2A/B HERE PLEASE 
An inspection of figures 2A and 2B clearly suggests that regardless of identification 
scheme, real GDP and the CPI always rise in response to an asset purchase shock. This 
effect is statistically significant throughout, except for identification scheme I for CPI in 
the UK.  Table A1 in online appendix A shows the maximum impacts of the median and 
indicates their significance.  For both countries the maximum values for the impact on 
both GDP and CPI are higher with identification schemes II, III and IV than they are 
with scheme I. This probably reflects the role that economic theory plays in identifying 
the effects with these schemes. Averaging across all four schemes,  the maximum impact 
on GDP is 0.58 in the United States and 0.25 in the United Kingdom (Table A1, online 
appendix A). The figures for the CPI are 0.62 and 0.32, respectively.  
Baumeister and Benati (2013) and Kapetanios et al (2012) use a conditional forecasting 
approach to quantify the impact of QE on real GDP and CPI in the US and the UK 
respectively.  Online appendix B contains the results of  a similar exercise (Waggoner and 
Zha, 1999) which suggest that QE1 raised GDP in the US (UK) by about 2 (4) percentage 
points at its peak impact; QE2 (QE2/3) added about 6 (4) percentage points. The CPI in 
the US was increased by an amount similar to the increase in GDP in each case while in 
the UK both QE1  and QE2/3 raised the CPI by just under 6 percentage points. As 
discussed in detail below, scaling up the peak impacts derived from the impulse response 
analysis yields broadly similar numbers.   
To relate our multipliers to those presented in previous work, we compare the 
effects of US and UK QE1 implied by the impulse responses in those studies, to the peak 
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impact  implied by the impulse responses in this paper. Baumeister and Benati (2013) for 
the US and Kapetanios et al (2012) for the UK  argue that the first round of asset 
purchases in the US and the UK led to fall of about 100 basis points in the spread between 
the long-term and short-term interest rate. It is then easy to see that the estimates in 
those papers imply a rise of 1.08 (2.5) percent and 0.9 (1.5) percent in GDP and CPI in the 
US (UK), respectively. During QE1, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England engaged 
in government bond purchases worth two and fourteen per cent of annualised 2009Q1 
GDP, respectively. Based on the estimates in this paper, this would lead to a rise of 1.12 
(3.08) percent and 1.2 (4.2) percent in US (UK) real GDP and CPI, respectively. When the 
effect of MBS purchases is included, the estimates for US real GDP and CPI become 1.4 
and 1.5. For the UK, the impact on real GDP is  slightly higher than previous work, but 
the CPI response is almost three times as large. This difference is not statistically 
significant but produces estimates for the inflation-output trade-off which are more in 
line with previous studies of conventional monetary policy in VARs for the UK.5    
3.2 Comparison with the Term Spread Shock Approach 
These quantitative differences may arise as a result of the identification scheme or 
the data on which the model was estimated. Both can be explored. First, our model 
structure can be modified to explore the role of shocks to the long rate.  Since policy rates 
were constant in both countries,  we simply apply the same identification scheme, but 
with the long rate substituted for asset purchases.6 This allows us to explore the role of 
                                                 
5 A comparison to previous work can be found in online appendix D. 
6 For identification scheme I, we order the long rate after output and prices, but before 
real equity prices. For identification scheme II, it is assumed that the long rate falls and 
real equity prices rise in response to unconventional monetary policy. For the 
identification scheme III, it is assumed that aggregate supply and demand shocks cannot 
affect the long rate contemporaneously. The risk/uncertainty shock is then identified as a 
shock that leads to a decline in real equity prices and the long rate, while the 
unconventional monetary policy shock is identified as a shock that leads to a decline in 
the long rate and rise in real equity prices. Finally, in identification scheme IV, it is 
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long rates as a possible transmission route of asset purchases.  Figures 3A and 3B show the 
impulse responses from this exercise and table A2 of  online appendix A their maximum 
impact. An unexpected shock leading to a 100 basis points decline in the long rate has the 
effect of raising both GDP and CPI by about 1.06 percent only in the United States.  
FIGURE 3A/B HERE PLEASE 
 These results, and quantitative estimates of QE1 obtained with our approach, 
which are very similar to previous findings, are consistent with the idea that US asset 
purchase announcements affect real activity through their impact on long-term 
government bond yields. In other words, the spread identification scheme used by 
previous work might be correct for the US.  For the UK, however, they suggest that the 
influence of asset purchases most likely affected GDP and CPI through channels other 
than the long rate..  
In online appendix C we show that our results do not depend on the inclusion of 
the first round of asset purchases in the data set. Figure C1 shows results estimated over 
the period 2010m3-2014m5. This omits the period when the financial crisis was at its 
most extreme. Our results are not greatly affected, suggesting that the impact of the 
second and third rounds of purchases in the UK and US was not very different from the 
impact of the first round. This suggests that asset purchases did not become less effective 
over time. Figure C2 looks at results estimated from 2007m1-2014m5. We now find that 
the effects on GDP are larger than in figures 2A and 2B. There is no significant effect on 
CPI in the UK with any of the identification schemes although the median impulse 
remains positive in all four cases. The inclusion of UK data before asset purchases were 
introduced might therefore explain why previous work found a smaller effect on CPI 
inflation; indeed our estimates (Table C2) for this period imply an inflation/output trade-
off of 0.37 rather than the value of 1.3 implied by our main results. This confirms our 
view that analysis over this extended period may be subject to the Lucas critique: in this 
case it seems to bias the UK inflation response to unconventional monetary policy to be 
                                                                                                                                                        
assumed that a long rate shock should explain the greatest fraction in the long rate 
forecast error variance decomposition. All other restrictions remain the same. 
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substantially lower than we find it to be. For the US, Tables C1 and C2 show that the 
quantitative magnitudes are larger, but the relative impact on output and inflation 
remains the same as in the base line case.  
 In summary, this suggests that the observed differences from previous work arise 
from both the inclusion of pre-asset purchase data and the difference in identification 
schemes, but these issues create substantially larger biases for the UK than the US.  
3.3   Evidence on Transmission Mechanisms  
Economic theory suggests three different ways in which asset purchases can affect  
demand. First there is portfolio rebalancing. If investors have preferred habitats, then 
asset purchases will either affect yields with the highest interest rate risk or yields at the 
maturity purchased through the impact on duration and scarcity, respectively. This 
should be reflected in a reduction of the term premium rather than a reduction in 
expected future spot rates. An alternative friction which leads to similar effects comes 
from the presence of transaction costs leading to imperfect substitutability in the 
government bond market (Harrison, 2012). These changes, together with associated 
spillovers into equity and private debt markets, are likely to lead to increases in both 
consumption and investment.  
Secondly, as Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) argue,  any announcement of 
unconventional policy may mean that interest rates will be kept at the zero lower bound 
for longer. In other words, the expected average short-term interest rate will decline as a 
result of the announcement. A reduction in either component, the term premium 
(portfolio rebalancing) or the average expected short-term interest rate (signaling) will 
lead to a decline in the long-term interest rate with subsequent impacts on demand. But 
portfolio rebalancing, through the impact on term premia, is likely to have a relatively 
larger impact on twenty and thirty-year maturity government bond yields, while the 
signaling channel should be reflected in movements of short-term interest rate futures. 
We include all of these variables into our model to asses which effect is stronger.   
Thirdly, asset purchase announcements can help the central bank to manage 
households and firms real GDP growth and inflation expectations. If asset purchases  
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make people more confident that the monetary authorities have a means of supporting 
the economy despite the fact that short-term interest rates are at the zero lower bound, 
then the perceived variance of future output and inflation will decline. This is likely to 
result in a decline in measures of financial market uncertainty. This can reflect either a 
reduction in household uncertainty about durable consumption or greater risk-taking by 
investors, as they search for yield. Both of these channels can support demand by raising 
consumption and reducing premia (spreads) on risky lending.  
The reduced-form nature of structural VARs does not allow us to decompose the 
estimated impacts into contributions from these different transmission channels directly. 
We can, however, identify variables which we would expect to be affected by asset 
purchases if each of these mechanisms plays a role in the transmission of this policy.  
 The extent to which each transmission mechanism should operate in each country 
clearly depends on the presence of financial frictions in the government bond market. 
The average maturity of government bonds was 4.2 and 14 years in the US and UK 
government bond markets at the end of 2007, which implies greater liquidity premia 
(transaction costs) in the US government bond market. Similarly, Asian central banks are 
natural preferred habitat investors in the US government bond market (Turner, 2011). 
This descriptive evidence would suggest a greater ex ante role for the portfolio balance 
channel in the US, rather than the UK.  To examine if this is the case, we include  the 
yields on government bonds of twenty and thirty years maturity, as well as the three-
month rate, six, twelve and twenty-four months ahead, as the sixth variable in the VAR. 
The results are shown in Figures 4A and 4B and the maximum impacts in table A3 of  
online appendix A. 
FIGURE 4A/B HERE PLEASE 
Table A3 demonstrates that, for the US, two sets of results show significant effects 
with at least three of the identification schemes. Twenty-year bond rates are affected by 
asset purchase shocks in all four schemes, while thirty-year bond yields are significant in 
three out of four schemes. While negative effects are also found more generally, they are 
not significant. Table A3 also illustrates the problems associated with relying on only one 
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identification scheme. In particular, identification scheme two suggests that most of the 
included variables are significant, particularly for the UK. 
Looking first at the US, figure 4A shows that the impact on twenty-year debt 
yields is similar to that found with long (10-year) bond yields shown in figure 2A, 
although of course for scheme II that was an identifying assumption. Interest rate futures 
tend to move in the right direction, but are not statistically significant. A reasonable 
conclusion is that these results provide evidence for the portfolio balance channel 
operating in the US, or that asset purchases affected yields on long-term debt. 
In the UK there is greater sensitivity of the results to the identification scheme. 
Both the long-term government bond yield and interest rate futures react in a statistically 
significant manner only with scheme II. Thus the responses of OIS and long-term rates do 
not, overall,  provide good evidence that either portfolio balance or signaling play 
significant roles in the UK. 
Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) use several dynamic term structure models to 
decompose the movements in long rates which they associate with asset purchases. They 
find that in the US the movements were largely the result of expected future short rates 
(signaling) while in the UK falls in term premia dominated (portfolio balance channel). 
There are several reasons why our results may differ from those of Christensen and 
Rudebusch (2012). First of all, they estimate their models using daily data stretching from 
the late 1980s until the end of 2010, since a long sample is needed to mitigate biases in the 
estimation of their model. As a result they need to make the assumption that asset 
purchase announcements are just normal shocks to the Treasury bond market. However, 
if this assumption is violated, their results may be susceptible to the Lucas Critique. 
Secondly, they look at the immediate impacts of announcements of asset purchases at 
daily frequency, while we are interested in movements at lower frequencies. Thirdly, 
their model assumes that the path of interest rates can be represented by a Brownian 
motion. This assumption may be invalid for the shorter end of the yield curve whose path 
might be explicitly constrained by the zero lower bound.  
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Asset purchases can, of course, also have a direct impact on the real economy by 
reducing uncertainty and managing expectations about future economic outcomes. 
Deaton (1992) shows how uncertainty depresses the current level of consumption and 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) how it reduces investment. Woodford (2003) argues that the 
one of the most important transmission channels of monetary policy is the management 
of expectations about future economic outcomes while Boivin et al. (2012) argue that 
there is empirical support for this view.  Expectations management is likely to reduce 
uncertainty, having effects on demand which do not need to be transmitted through 
financial markets, although it may reduce market risk premia.  
  We explore the impact on two measures of financial market uncertainty for that 
purpose: the implied volatility of the share price index (VIX) and interest rate futures 
(swaptions) in each country (MOVE). Two of the interpretations taken by previous work 
are that these measures reflect real economic uncertainty (Bloom, 2009) or investors’ risk 
appetite (Bruno and Shin, 2015).  To disentangle these two different interpretations, 
household survey measures of uncertainty and the BBB-AAA corporate bond spread into 
are included as a sixth variable in our VAR model to establish whether there is a 
significant response to asset purchase shocks. The results are shown in figures 5A/5B and 
the peak impacts are found in table A4 of  online appendix A.  
FIGURE 5A/B HERE PLEASE 
Figures 5A and 5B and table A4 demonstrate that both the VIX and MOVE show 
significant movements in the UK, while only MOVE does so in the US. Bloom (2009) 
argues that the VIX is a reflection of uncertainty. On the other hand, Adrian and Shin 
(2010), Bruno and Shin (2015) and Miranda-Aggripino and Rey (2013) argue that the VIX 
is a reflection of investor’s risk appetite. Interestingly, the reaction of household 
uncertainty over durable purchases suggests that the first interpretation is relevant for 
both countries. Similarly, the fact that corporate bond spreads react significantly in three 
of the four identification schemes for the UK only is stronger evidence that the risk-
taking channel plays a role in the UK.   
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3.4 Robustness 
We examine the robustness of our results from two perspectives. First, we investigate 
whether they may be subject to omitted variable bias and then explore whether they are 
materially affected by the way in which the announcements of asset purchases are defined.  
3.4.1 Omitted Variable Bias 
 Due to the short sample size, our baseline model consists of five variables. But it is 
well known that small VARs may suffer from omitted variable bias. The asset purchase 
shock may reflect the reaction of the monetary authority to coincident developments, 
such as domestic fiscal policy, the Euro Area crisis, real oil prices and monetary expansion 
by the European Central Bank. This can be explored by including the domestic 
government budget balance to GDP ratio, the public debt to GDP ratio, the spread 
between Italian and German 10-year government bond yields, the natural logarithm of 
real oil price in US dollars/UK sterling, the ratio of the ECB’s total assets on its balance 
sheet to Euro Area GDP, the trade balance to GDP ratio and the real exchange rate one by 
one in our VAR. The impulse response charts are shown in online appendix C, figures C3 
to C9 while tables C3 to C9 make clear the maximum effects and statistical significance.  
A comparison of the base results for the mean maximum effects in table A1 with 
those in tables C3 to C9 shows that these results are robust to the inclusion of additional 
variables. For the United States all four identification schemes continue to show a 
significant impact on CPI; for the United Kingdom scheme I does not show a significant 
effect, just as it did not in our basic model. However, in the majority of cases our main 
effects of interest are statistically different from zero and they are quantitatively very 
similar to the estimated effects from the model presented in figures 2A and 2B.  
3.4.2 Definition of the announcement series 
Our model assumes that macroeconomic variables tend to respond to 
announcements, rather than actual asset purchases. But it is worth verifying whether our 
results are robust to using the actual amount of assets purchased instead. Similarly, in 
contrast to the UK, the nature of asset purchases in the US has changed over time, with 
the Federal Reserve engaging in Operation Twist and open-ended purchases, as well as 
purchases of mortgage-backed securities. This means that a number of assumptions were 
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needed  to create the asset purchase announcement series for the US and it is 
demonstrated  that our results are robust to all of them in this section.  
There were six possible alternatives for the United States; only the first of these is 
also relevant to the United Kingdom. Looking at the amount of assets purchased rather 
than the announcements, the impulse response effects (figure C10) remained significantly 
above zero in all four cases. 
In our asset purchase announcement series, announcements associated with the 
Federal Reserve’s maturity extension program (also known as Operation Twist) receive 
the same weight as asset purchases of government bonds that were financed through the 
issue of central bank reserves. While it is clearly difficult to pinpoint the right weight for 
Operation Twist announcements, we also explore results with a weight of one half, 
probably a reasonable lower bound, in figure C9. These results are similar to our baseline 
results, but not significant for identification scheme IV for the real GDP response. If the 
portfolio channel is an important part of the transmission mechanism in the United 
States, as the earlier results suggest, then perhaps it is not surprising that significance is 
reduced when Operation Twist is down-rated.  
The Federal Reserve Board also announced open-ended purchases of government 
bonds at a rate of $US 45 bn per month in 2012. It is unclear how to translate the 
magnitude of this announcement to one that is comparable to other US asset purchase 
announcements. At the time of the announcement, guidance was also provided that the 
federal funds rate would stay low until unemployment had reached the 6.5% threshold. 
FOMC minutes that accompanied the announcement suggested that this would be met in 
2015, implying that purchases would continue for at least three years. One way of 
calculating the economic impact of the open-ended asset purchase announcement is 
therefore to calculate the present value7 of an asset that pays $US 45 bn each month, for 
thirty-six months. This suggests that the economic impact of the open-ended asset 
purchase announcement was about $US 1217bn. Financial markets may of course take a 
different view and an examination of OIS rate futures data suggest that they expected a 
                                                 
7
 The yield on the 10-year government bond in the month prior to the announcement was the 
discount rate used for our calculation. 
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rise in the three month OIS rate twenty-four, but not twelve months ahead. Assuming 
that open-ended QE will expire after eighteen months yields an economic impact of    
$US 702bn, which is similar to the impact of the second asset purchase announcement 
($US 600bn). In December 2013, the FOMC announced that the rate at which assets were 
purchased would slow. This announcement is treated as an unwinding of the open-ended 
purchases, meaning that  $US 1217bn and $US 702bn are subtracted from the total asset 
purchase announcement series for the eighteen and thirty-six months cases, respectively. 
This is shown in figures C12 and C13. The GDP response is significant with all four 
schemes while the CPI response is significant with the first three with all our different 
assumptions about how long open-ended purchases last.  
 In addition to government bonds, the Federal Reserve also purchased large 
quantities of mortgage-backed securities. Most of these purchases were made before 
March 2009, when government bond purchases began, and from September 2012, when 
open-ended purchases of mortgage backed securities at a rate of US$ 40bn USD per 
month were announced. Following the same approach as for government bonds the 
present discounted value of mortgage-backed securities for eighteen and thirty-six 
months respectively is added and then subtracted. We also add the MBS purchases before 
2009m3 to our series. The impact of asset purchases (figures C14 and C15) on GDP is still 
statistically significant in at least three out of four identification schemes. While the 
evidence for CPI is weaker, the major part of the 68% Bayesian credible sets is above 
zero. 
A comparison of figures C12-C15 with figure 2A and tables C12 to C15 with table 
A1 suggests that the peak responses in these four variants are generally lower. This is to 
be expected since the total sum of purchases is larger, and we should not look for 
robustness in terms of the coefficients. Our findings about statistical significance are, 
however, robust to the definition of asset purchases used.  
4 Conclusion 
In response to the ‘Great Recession’, central banks deployed a range of novel 
monetary policy tools, but their impact on the economy is still not well understood. In 
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this paper we study purchases of government bonds by the Bank of England and the 
Federal Reserve. We find a significant impact of asset purchases on GDP and CPI without 
making the identifying assumption that this is positive and with models estimated only 
on the period in which asset purchases were carried out; models estimated over a longer 
period may be more susceptible to the Lucas critique. The analysis also makes more use of 
non-informative priors than does any other paper in this literature. 
Our results suggest that an asset purchase shock that results in the central bank 
purchasing government bonds worth 1% of nominal GDP, leads a rise of about .62% 
(.25%) of real GDP and .58% (.32%) in CPI in the US (UK). These results are robust to 
including a number of different additional variables in the VAR. Similarly, using the 
actual amount of assets purchased as the main variable of interest and, for the US, various 
perturbations to the definition of asset purchases makes little difference to our findings. 
Our estimates8 of the impact of asset purchases on real GDP and CPI are similar to studies 
that identify unconventional monetary policy as a compression in the spread between the 
long and the short rate (Baumeister et al, 2013; Kapetanios et al, 2012), with one notable 
exception: for the UK,  the CPI response is almost three times larger than documented by 
previous work;  the implied inflation-output trade-off is, however, consistent with studies 
of the conventional monetary policy transmission mechanism and may help explain why 
UK inflation was higher than expected after asset purchases began. 
For the United States  long-term bond yields respond to asset purchases while 
short-term swap rates do not. This suggests that the portfolio balance may play a role 
while it is unlikely that signaling is important. Asset purchases reduce measures of 
financial market and household uncertainty in both countries. In addition, in the UK 
there is a rise in the appetite for risk. This suggests that managing expectations through 
                                                 
8
 Previous studies used conditional forecasts in their VAR models to compare a ‘QE’ to a ‘No 
QE’scenario and asses the total macroeconomic impact of the policy. We repeat this type of 
exercise in online appendix B. It turns out that, at least in our case, the total effect obtained 
from the conditional forecasts is quantitatively broadly similar to multipliying the asset 
purchase announcement by the corresponding peak impulse response effect, justifying our 
use of peak impacts in this paper.  
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reducing uncertainty  (Bloom, 2009) may be relevant for both countries, and the risk-
taking channel (Bruno and Shin, 2015) for the transmission mechanism in the UK.  
Our results have important implications for policy. In both the UK and the US 
asset purchases were an effective means of supporting GDP in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, and  they retained their effectiveness beyond the acute phase of the crisis. 
This should provide considerable reassurance for those who are concerned that, with 
interest rates still at or close to their lower bound, monetary authorities will find it 
difficult to respond to renewed global demand weakness.   
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Table 1 – Identification schemes 
 𝑝 
Log CPI 
𝑦 
Log real 
GDP 
AP 
Asset 
Purchases 
𝑖𝑡  
Long Interest 
Rate 
𝑠𝑝𝑡 
Log Real Equity 
Price 
Identification Scheme I 
Log CPI 1 0 0 0 0 
Log real GDP  1 0 0 0 
Asset Purchases   1 0 0 
Long Interest Rate    1 0 
Log Real Equity Price     1 
Identification Scheme II 
Supply Shock                      − +  + + 
Demand Shock + +  + + 
Asset Purchase Shock   + − + 
Identification Scheme III 
Supply Shock                      − + 0   
Demand Shock + + 0   
Asset Purchase Shock   +  + 
Uncertainty Shock   +  − 
Identification Scheme IV 
    Variance Decomposition Restrictions 
Supply Shock                      − +  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠)
< 𝑀𝐴𝑋(
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠)
)         
Demand Shock + +  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠)
< 𝑀𝐴𝑋(
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠)
) 
Asset Purchase Shock   + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠)
= 𝑀𝐴𝑋(
𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠)
) 
This table shows the restrictions imposed by each of the  four identification schemes. 
Grey shading indicates that the response of the variable (in the column) to the shock (in 
the row) is unrestricted, + indicates that it is restricted to be non-negative, 1 to be 1, 0 to 
be zero and – to be non-positive.   
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Figure 2A: Results for the standard specification – United States 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the US. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. The units 
of the vertical axes are shown for each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the 
announcement. 
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Figure 2B: Results for the standard specification – United Kingdom 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the UK. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. The units 
of the vertical axes are shown for each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the 
anouncement. 
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Figure 3A: Results for a shock to the long rate – United States 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables list above, the median impulse responses in response to a one percent decline in the long 
rate, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identification schemes for the US. 10,500 simulations, with 
the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses.  
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Figure 3B: Results for a shock to the long rate – United Kingdom 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables list above, the median impulse responses in response to a one percent decline in the long 
rate, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identification schemes for the UK. 10,500 simulations, 
with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. The units of the vertical axes are shown for each column, while 
the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the anouncement. 
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Figure 4A: Results for Portfolio Balance & Signaling Channels – United States 
 
 This figure shows, for each of the variables list above, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the US. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. OIS 6M, 
OIS 12M and OIS 24M are the 3-month rate, 6 months, 12 months and 24 months ahead. 20Y and 30Y GB YIELD are the yields on 20 
and 30 year government debt. The units of the vertical axes are shown for each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number 
of monthly time periods since the anouncement.   
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Figure 4B: Results for Portfolio Balance & Signaling Channels – United Kingdom 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables list above, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the US. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. OIS 6M, 
OIS 12M and OIS 24M are the 3-month rate, 6 months, 12 months and 24 months ahead. 20Y and 30Y GB YIELD are the yields on 20 
and 30 year government debt The units of the vertical axes are shown for each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number 
of monthly time periods since the anouncement.    
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Figure 5A – Results for the Uncertainty Channel – United States 
 
 
This figure shows the response functions of the VIX, the MOVE, a measure of household uncertainty (HHUNC) and the 
spread between BBB and AAA corporate bonds to an asset purchase shock. Results are shown for the US for each of our four 
identification schemes. Five hundred simulations were used to generate the responses. The units of the vertical axes are shown for 
each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the anouncement. 
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Figure 5B – Results for the Uncertainty Channel – United Kingdom 
 
 
This figure shows the response functions of the VIX, the MOVE, a measure of household uncertainty (HHUNC) and the spread 
between BBB and AAA corporate bonds to an asset purchase shock. Results are shown for the UK for each of our four identification 
schemes. Five hundred simulations were used to generate the responses. The units of the vertical axes are shown for each column, 
while the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the anouncement.   
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Appendix A – Tables showing Maximum Impact of Impulse 
Response Functions and their Significance 
Table A1: Maximum Impact of Asset Purchase Shocks (percentage points) 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.28* 0.77* 0.82* 0.46* 0.58 
US CPI 0.32* 0.84* 0.82* 0.51* 0.62 
UK GDP 0.12* 0.30* 0.32* 0.25* 0.25 
UK CPI 0.00 0.65* 0.38* 0.26* 0.32 
 
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one percent rise in asset purchase 
announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP,  when the estimation periods is 2010m3 – 2014m5. Median peak effects are shown for the 
US and the UK for each identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the 
peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets 
 
 
Table A2:  Maximum Impact of Long Rate Shocks (percentage points) 
 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.70* 1.82* 1.14* 0.56 1.06 
US CPI 0.55* 1.98* 1.29* 0.40 1.06 
UK GDP -0.23* 1.04 1.24 -0.11 0.66 
UK CPI 1.20* 3.47* 3.82* 0.95 2.36 
 
This table shows the maximum effects on real GDP and CPI of negative long rate shocks. Median peak effects are shown for the US 
and the UK for each identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the 
peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
 
Table A3: Maximum Impact of Asset Purchase Shocks on OIS and Long-term 
Government Bond Rates (percentage points) 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US OIS 6M -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
US OIS 12M 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
US OIS 24M 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 
US 20Y GB Yield -0.10* -0.16* -0.17* -0.16* -0.15* 
US 30Y GB Yield -0.07 -0.14* -0.16* -0.14* -0.13* 
UK OIS 6M -0.01 -0.05* -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
UK OIS 12M 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
UK OIS 24M 0.00 -0.15* -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 
UK 20Y GB Yield 0.00 -0.17* -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 
UK 30Y GB Yield -0.01 -0.11* -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
 
This table shows the peak effects of the median impulse response in response to a one percent rise in asset purchase announcement as a 
share of 2009Q1 GDP, for all of the variables listed in the table. Median peak effects are shown for the US and the UK for each  
identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the peak response the value 
of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. OIS 6M, OIS 12M and OIS 24M are the 3-month rate, 6 months, 12 months and 24 
months ahead. 20Y and 30Y GB YIELD are the yields on 20 and 30 year government debt.   
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Table A4: Maximum Impact of Asset Purchases on Indicators of Uncertainty 
(percentage points) 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US VIX -1.11* -2.57* -2.42 -0.93 -1.76 
US MOVE -3.06* -7.90* -9.40 -3.97 -6.08 
US HHUNC -5.44* -7.87* -10.06* -3.48 -6.71 
US BAA-AAA Spread -0.05 -0.14* -0.19* -0.06 -0.11 
UK VIX -0.67* -0.84 -1.06* -0.81* -0.85 
UK MOVE -2.10* -4.79* -2.83* -3.01* -3.18 
UK HHUNC -5.82* -10.30 -14.02* -10.30* -10.11 
UK BAA-AAA Spread -0.07* -0.12 -0.14* -0.08* -0.10 
 
This table shows the maximum effect of asset purchase shocks on the percentile responses of the MOVE, the VIX, the household 
measure of uncertainty (HHUNC) and the BBB-AAA corporate bond spread. Median peak effects are shown for the US and the UK for 
each identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the peak response the 
value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
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Appendix B – A Counterfactual Approach 
Baumeister and Benati (2012), Lenza et al (2012) and Kapetanios et al (2012) examine the 
macroeconomic impact of unconventional monetary policy measures in the US/UK, the 
Euro Area and the UK through conditional forecasting exercises in their estimated VAR  
models by applying the methodology presented in Waggoner and Zha (1999). We repeat 
this exercise with our estimated VARs for the UK and the US to examine to which extent 
our results are quantitatively similar or different from previous work. The disadvantage of 
this exercise is that it is a counterfactual and hence potentially subject to the Lucas 
Critque, since agents may have reacted differently in the absence of the policy. Yet unlike 
impulse response analysis, this provides a way to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the 
policy in the way that is similar and comparable to all other papers in the literature. 
 
Figure B1 shows two different conditional forecasting exercises. The first one, in row one, 
simulates the impact of the first phase of US asset purchase anouncements, also referred 
to as QE1, on the path of real GDP and CPI  as they were implemented in the data for 20 
months, before QE was implemented. The second one shows the path of real GDP and 
CPI based on a conditional forecast where the asset purchase announcement remains at 
its initial value. The third row shows the difference in percent. This suggests that US QE1 
raised US real GDP and CPI by about 2%, which is in line with the findings in Baumeister 
and Benati (2012). US QE 2 had an impact which was almost twice as large, which is not 
surprising, given that the announced purchases of assets were more than twice as large. 
 
Figure B2 shows the corresponding exercise for the UK. This suggests that UK QE1 raised 
real GDP by about 3.5%, which is a bit larger, but certainly not statistically different 
from, the 2.5% value reported in Kapetanios et al (2012). Compared to their paper, the 
impact on CPI is about 4 times as large, but as shown in online appendix C, this is 
consistent with inflation-output tradeoff found in VAR studies of the UK monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. This is also consistent with the observation that the UK 
experienced persistent above target inflation following the introduction of the policy.  
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Figure B1: Counterfactual Forecasts in the presence/absence of QE1 and QE2 
for US real GDP and CPI 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation.  
Note: QE1 refers to a simulation with the first US asset purchase announcement as it was. No US QE1 refers to a 
simulation where QE1 was set to previous value of zero. The third row shows the difference in percent.  For QE2, the 
no-policy simulation is based on the value of the asset purchase announcement series before the announcement of the 
policy, i.e. 2.086% of 2009Q1 GDP. 
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Figure B2: Counterfactual Forecasts in the presence/absence of QE1 and 
QE2/3 for UK real GDP and CPI 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation.  
Note: QE1 refers to a simulation with the first UK asset purchase announcement as it was. No UK QE1 refers to a 
simulation where QE1 was set to the initial value of 5.34% of 2009Q1 GDP. The third row shows the difference in 
percent.  For QE2/3, the no-policy simulation is based on the value of the asset purchase announcement series before 
the announcement of the policy, i.e. 14.24% of 2009Q1 GDP. 
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Appendix C – Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Figure C1: Results for Short Sample (2010m3-2014m5)  
 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the US and the UK. The estimation period is 2010m3 – 2014m5. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as 
burn-in, were used to generate the responses.   
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Figure C2: Results for Long Sample (2007m1-2014m5) 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the US and the UK. The estimation period is 2007m1 – 2014m5. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as 
burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure C3: Results with Gov. Budget Balance as Control Variable  
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the US and the UK.  The ratio of the budget balance to GDP is included as a control variable, but not shown. 
10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure C4: Results with Public Debt to GDP ratio as Control Variable Maximum Impact  
 
 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the US and the UK.  The ratio of public debt to nominal GDP is included as a control variable, but not 
shown. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses.   
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
U
S
-I
Real GDP         
(log units x 100)
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
CPI              
(log units x 100)
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Asset Purchases
(% 2009Q1 GDP) 
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Long Rate
(% pts)  
20 40
-5
0
5
10
Real Equity Prices
(log units x 100) 
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
U
S
-I
II
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
20 40
-5
0
5
10
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
U
S
-I
I
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
20 40
-5
0
5
10
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
U
S
-I
V
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
20 40
-5
0
5
10
20 40
0
0.5
1
U
K
-I
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-1
0
1
2
20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
20 40
-2
0
2
4
20 40
0
0.5
1
U
K
-I
II
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-1
0
1
2
20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
20 40
-2
0
2
4
20 40
0
0.5
1
U
K
-I
I
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-1
0
1
2
20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
20 40
-2
0
2
4
20 40
0
0.5
1
months
U
K
-I
V
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
20 40
-1
0
1
2
months
20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
months
20 40
-2
0
2
4
months
 
 
68th Quantile Median
  
Discussion Paper No. 42 January 2015 43 
Figure C5: Results with the Real Oil Price as Control Variable 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the US and the UK.  The real oil price is included as a control variable, but not shown. 10,500 simulations, 
with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses.  
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Figure C6: Results with the Italian to German 10-year Government Bond Yield Spread as 
Control Variable 
  
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the US and the UK.  The Italian to German 10-year government bond yield spread is included as a control 
variable, but not shown. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses.  
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Figure C7: Results with ECB Total Assets to Euro Area GDP Ratio as Control Variable 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four 
identification schemes for the US and the UK.  The ECB’s total assets to nominal Euro-Area GDP is included as a control variable, but 
not shown. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses.  
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Figure C8: Results with Real Exchange Rate as Control Variable 
 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identification schemes 
for the US and the UK, with the real exchange rate as a control variable. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used 
to generate the responses.  
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
U
S
-I
Real GDP         
(log units x 100)
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
CPI              
(log units x 100)
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Asset Purchases
(% 2009Q1 GDP) 
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Long Rate 
(% pts)   
20 40
-5
0
5
10
Real Equity Prices 
(log units x 100)  
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
U
S
-I
II
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
20 40
-5
0
5
10
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
U
S
-I
I
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
20 40
-5
0
5
10
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
U
S
-I
V
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
20 40
-5
0
5
10
20 40
0
0.5
1
U
K
-I
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-1
0
1
2
20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
20 40
-2
0
2
4
20 40
0
0.5
1
U
K
-I
II
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-1
0
1
2
20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
20 40
-2
0
2
4
20 40
0
0.5
1
U
K
-I
I
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
20 40
-1
0
1
2
20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
20 40
-2
0
2
4
20 40
0
0.5
1
months
U
K
-I
V
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
20 40
-1
0
1
2
months
20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
months
20 40
-2
0
2
4
months
 
 
68th Quantile Median
  
Discussion Paper No. 42 January 2015 47 
Figure C9: Results with the Trade Balance to GDP ratio as Control Variable 
 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identification schemes 
for the US and the UK, with the real exchange rate as a control variable. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used 
to generate the responses.  
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Figure C10: Results with amount of assets purchased 
 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identification schemes 
for the US and the UK, with the baseline asset purchase announcement series replaced by actual amounts of asset purchased. 10,500 
simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure C11: Results for US with half weight on Operation Twist Announcements 
 
 This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent 
asset purchase as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identification 
schemes for the US and the UK, with the baseline asset purchase announcement series replaced by a series where we put a weight of 
half on the Federal Reserve’s Operation Twist. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the 
responses.  
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Figure C12:  Impact of US Open-ended Asset Purchases assumed to last 18 months 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identification schemes 
for the US and the UK, with the baseline asset purchase announcement series replaced  by a series where we add the impact of present 
discounted value of open-ended treasury purchases assuming that they last 18 months. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as 
burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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 Figure C13: Impact of US Open-ended Asset Purchases assumed to last 36 months 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identification schemes 
for the US and the UK, with the baseline asset purchase announcement series replaced  by a series where we add the impact of present 
discounted value of open-ended treasury purchases assuming that they last 36 months. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as 
burn-in, were used to generate the responses.  
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Figure C14:  Impact of including Mortgage-backed Securities and all Open-ended Asset 
Purchases are assumed to last 18 months 
 
This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent asset 
purchase as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identification schemes 
for the US and the UK, with the baseline asset purchase announcement series replaced  by a series where we add the impact of  
mortgage-backed securities (mbs) and the present discounted value of open-ended treasury and mbs purchases assuming that they last 
18 months. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses.  
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
U
S
-I
Real GDP         
(log units x 100)
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
CPI              
(log units x 100)
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
Asset Purchases
(% 2009Q1 GDP) 
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
months
Long Rate 
(% pts)   
20 40
-5
0
5
10
months
Real Equity Prices
(log units x 100) 
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
U
S
-I
II
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
months
20 40
-5
0
5
10
months
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
U
S
-I
I
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
months
20 40
-5
0
5
10
months
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
U
S
-I
V
20 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
months
20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
months
20 40
-5
0
5
10
months
 
 
68th Quantile Median
  
Discussion Paper No. 42 January 2015 53 
Figure C15:  Impact of including Mortgage-backed Securities and all Open-ended Asset 
Purchases are assumed to last 36 months 
 
  This figure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an unexpected one percent 
asset purchase as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identification 
schemes for the US and the UK, with the baseline asset purchase announcement series replaced  by a series where we add the impact 
of  mortgage-backed securities (mbs) and the present discounted value of open-ended treasury and mbs purchases assuming that they 
last 36 months. 10,500 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Table C1 Maximum Impact: Estimation Period 2010m3-2014m5 (percentage points) 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.23* 0.77* 0.63* 0.38* 0.50 
US CPI 0.27* 0.88* 0.73* 0.50* 0.59 
UK GDP 0.12* 0.65* 0.51* 0.29* 0.39 
UK CPI 0.05 1.13* 0.68* 0.33* 0.55 
 
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one percent rise in asset purchase 
announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP,  when the estimation periods is 2010m3 – 2014m5. Median peak effects are shown for the 
US and the UK for each identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the 
peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
 
 
Table C2 Maximum Impact: Estimation Period 2007m1-2014m5 (percentage points) 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.70* 1.02* 0.89* 0.78* 0.85 
US CPI 0.44* 1.09* 0.69* 0.63* 0.71 
UK GDP 0.35* 0.48* 0.43* 0.38* 0.41 
UK CPI 0.03 0.28 0.12 0.18 0.15 
 
 
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one 
percent rise in asset purchase announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP,  when the estimation periods is 
2007m1 – 2014m5. Median peak effects are shown for the US and the UK for each identification scheme, 
together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the peak response the 
value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
 
 
Table C3: Maximum Impact with Government Budget Balance as a Control Variable 
(percentage points) 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.33* 0.77* 0.78* 0.53* 0.60 
US CPI 0.35* 0.80* 0.79* 0.53* 0.62 
UK GDP 0.12* 0.36* 0.39* 0.26* 0.28 
UK CPI 0.00 0.82 0.47* 0.26* 0.39 
  
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one 
percent rise in asset purchase announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP, when the ratio of the government 
budget balance to nominal GDP is included as a control variable. Median peak effects are shown for the US 
and the UK for each identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * 
indicates that at the time of the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
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Table C4: Maximum Impact with the Ratio of Public Debt to GDP as a Control Variable 
(percentage points) 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.22* 0.72* 0.71* 0.36* 0.50 
US CPI 0.26* 0.80* 0.84* 0.46* 0.59 
UK GDP 0.10* 0.31* 0.35* 0.22* 0.24 
UK CPI 0.01 0.56* 0.41* 0.25* 0.31 
  
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one percent rise in asset purchase 
announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP, when the ratio of public debt to nominal GDP is included as a control variable. Median peak 
effects are shown for the US and the UK for each identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * 
indicates that at the time of the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
 
 
Table C5: Maximum Impact with the Real Price of Oil as a Control Variable (percentage 
points) 
 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.27* 0.76* 0.92* 0.55* 0.63* 
US CPI 0.30* 0.82* 0.94* 0.58* 0.66* 
UK GDP 0.07* 0.32* 0.26* 0.16* 0.20* 
UK CPI 0.00 0.75* 0.43* 0.24* 0.35* 
  
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one percent rise in asset purchase 
announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP, when the real oil price is included as a control variable. Median peak effects are shown for 
the US and the UK for each identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of 
the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
. 
 
Table C6: Maximum Impact with the Italian to German 10-year Government Bond Yield 
Spread as a Control Variable (percentage points) 
 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.29* 0.77* 0.85* 0.50* 0.60 
US CPI 0.30* 0.83* 0.90* 0.54* 0.64 
UK GDP 0.11* 0.34* 0.37* 0.25* 0.27 
UK CPI 0.00 0.71* 0.46* 0.25* 0.36 
  
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one percent rise in asset purchase 
announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP, when the Italian to German 10-year government bond yield spread is included as a control 
variable. Median peak effects are shown for the US and the UK for each identification scheme, together with the mean across 
identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
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Table C7: Maximum Impact with the Ratio of ECB Total Assets to Euro Area GDP as a 
Control Variable (percentage points) 
 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.29* 0.74* 0.89* 0.50* 0.60 
US CPI 0.30* 0.82* 0.96* 0.57* 0.66 
UK GDP 0.11* 0.33* 0.34* 0.23* 0.25 
UK CPI 0.00 0.75* 0.44* 0.25* 0.36 
  
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one percent rise in asset purchase 
announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP, when the ratio of ECB Total Assets to Euro Area GDP is included as a control variable. 
Median peak effects are shown for the US and the UK for each identification scheme, together with the mean across identification 
schemes. * indicates that at the time of the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
 
 
Table C8: Maximum Impact with Real Exchange Rate as control variable 
 (percentage points) 
 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.27* 0.83* 0.93* 0.47* 0.63 
US CPI 0.31* 0.84* 0.90* 0.53* 0.64 
UK GDP 0.11* 0.31* 0.40* 0.25* 0.27 
UK CPI 0.00 0.69* 0.50* 0.25* 0.36 
  
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one percent rise in asset purchase 
announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP, with the real exchange rate as a control variable. Median peak effects are shown for the US 
and the UK for each  identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the 
peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
 
 
Table C9: Maximum Impact with Trade Balance to GDP ratio as control variable 
 (percentage points) 
 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.37* 0.81* 0.91* 0.42* 0.63 
US CPI 0.37* 0.85* 0.91* 0.48* 0.65 
UK GDP 0.12* 0.32* 0.35* 0.22* 0.26 
UK CPI 0.01 0.75* 0.45* 0.24* 0.36 
  
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one percent rise in asset purchase 
announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP, with the trade balance to GDP ratio as a control variable. Median peak effects are shown for 
the US and the UK for each identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of 
the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
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Table C10: Maximum Impact with Asset Purchases rather than Purchase Announcements 
Modeled (percentage points) 
 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.37* 0.48* 0.36* 0.40* 0.40 
US CPI 0.36* 0.47* 0.34* 0.38* 0.39 
UK GDP 0.19* 0.32* 0.51* 0.32* 0.33 
UK CPI 0.15* 0.69* 0.62* 0.40* 0.47 
  
This table shows the peak effects of the median real GDP and CPI impulse response in response to a one percent rise in asset purchase 
announcement as a share of 2009Q1 GDP, with the baseline asset purchase announcement series replaced by actual amounts of asset 
purchased. Median peak effects are shown for the US and the UK for each identification scheme, together with the mean across 
identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
 
 
Table C11: Maximum Impact when Operation Twist Announcements are given a Half 
Weight (percentage points) 
 
I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.30* 0.79* 0.74* 0.39 0.56 
US CPI 0.36* 0.86* 0.79* 0.47* 0.62 
 
This table shows the maximum effects on real GDP and CPI when the baseline asset purchase announcement series replaced by a series 
where we put a weight of half on the Federal Reserve’s Operation Twist. Median peak effects are shown for each identification 
scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the peak response the value of zero lies 
outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
 
 
Table C12: Maximum Impact when US Open-ended Purchases are assumed to last 18 
Months (percentage points) 
Maximum Impact (percentage points) 
 I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.19* 0.57* 0.33* 0.23* 0.33 
US CPI 0.12* 0.53* 0.31* 0.17 0.28 
 
This table shows the maximum effects on real GDP and CPI when the baseline asset purchase announcement series is replaced by a 
series where we add the impact of present discounted value of open-ended treasury purchases assuming that they last 18 months. 
Median peak effects are shown for each identification scheme, together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at 
the time of the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian credible sets. 
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Table C13: Maximum Impact when US Open-ended Purchases are assumed to last 36 
Months (percentage points) 
Maximum Impact (percentage points) 
 I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.11* 0.34* 0.18* 0.14* 0.19 
US CPI 0.06* 0.33* 0.16* 0.08 0.15 
 
This table shows the maximum effects on real GDP and CPI of negative long rate shocks when the baseline asset purchase 
announcement series is replaced by a series where we add the impact of present discounted value of open-ended treasury purchases 
assuming that they last 36 months. Median peak effects are shown for the US and the UK for each identification scheme, together with 
the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 68% Bayesian 
credible sets. 
 
Table C14: Maximum Impact when US Purchases of mortgage-backed securities are 
included and all Open-ended Purchases are assumed to last 18 Months (percentage 
points) 
 
Maximum Impact (percentage points) 
 I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.11* 0.34* 0.18* 0.14* 0.19 
US CPI 0.06* 0.33* 0.16* 0.08 0.15 
 
This table shows the maximum effects on real GDP and CPI when the baseline asset purchase announcement series is replaced by a 
series where we add the impact of  mortgage-backed securities (mbs) and the present discounted value of open-ended treasury and mbs 
purchases assuming that they last 18 months. Median peak effects are shown for the US and the UK for each identification scheme, 
together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 
68% Bayesian credible sets. 
 
 
Table C15: Maximum Impact when US Purchases of mortgage-backed securities are 
included and all Open-ended Purchases are assumed to last 36 Months (percentage 
points) 
Maximum Impact (percentage points) 
 I II III IV Mean 
US GDP 0.06* 0.22* 0.11* 0.07* 0.11 
US CPI 0.02* 0.19* 0.09* 0.04 0.08 
 
This table shows the maximum effects on real GDP and CPI when the baseline asset purchase announcement series is replaced by a 
series where we add the impact of  mortgage-backed securities (mbs) and the present discounted value of open-ended treasury and mbs 
purchases assuming that they last 36 months. Median peak effects are shown for the US and the UK for each identification scheme, 
together with the mean across identification schemes. * indicates that at the time of the peak response the value of zero lies outside the 
68% Bayesian credible sets. 
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Appendix D:  The Relationship between GDP and CPI 
Effects 
 
One way of comparing the plausibility of our results in this paper is to compare the 
implied ratio of the maximum effect on inflation to GDP with that found in other VAR 
studies of monetary policy. This exercise is presented in Table C1 for studies of asset 
purchase and conventional monetary policy. The results for the latter are taken from 
Cloyne and Huertgen (2014).  
Table D1: Output and Inflation Effects of Monetary Stimulus 
Country Study 
CPI 
Impact 
GDP 
Impact Ratio 
United Kingdom 
   Interest 
Rate* Liu et al (2011) -1.15 -0.5 2.3 
 
Cloyne et al (2014) -1 -0.6 1.7 
Asset 
Purchases** Weale and Wieladek (2015) 0.32 0.25 1.3 
 
Kapetanios et at (2012) 1.5 2.5 0.6 
 
Baumeister and Benati (2013) 1.5 1.8 0.8 
United States 
   Interest 
Rate* Romer and Romer (2004) -4.75 -3.1 1.5 
 
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) -1.15 -0.8 1.4 
 
Christiano et al (1999) -0.6 -0.7 0.9 
 
Bernanke et al (2005) -0.7 -0.6 1.2 
 
Coibion (2012) -3 -2.95 1.0 
Asset 
Purchases** Weale and Wieladek (2015) 0.62 0.58 1.1 
 
Baumeister and Benati (2013) 0.84 1.08 0.8 
* An interest rate increase of one percentage point 
** Asset purchases of one per cent of GDP for Weale and Wieladek. For Baumeister and Benati (2013)/Kapetanios 
et al (2012) we show the peak response to a one percent decline in the long-term to short-term rate spread. 
 
A notable feature of the other studies of asset purchases is that they show a smaller 
inflation to GDP ratio than is typically found in studies of conventional monetary policy. 
Qualitatively, this is also the case for the corresponding ratio implied by our results, but 
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the quantitative figures are much closer to those for conventional monetary policy in 
both countries.  
 
It is, of course, possible that the inflation-output trade-off has changed since asset 
purchases were introduced. However, since Baumeister and Benati (2013) and Kapetanios 
et al (2012) were estimated using predominantly pre-crisis data, this is unlikely to account 
for these differences. This means that an explanation would have to be structured around 
the differences in the strength of the underlying transmission mechanisms between 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy. It is reassuring that our results have 
much less need of any such explanation because they are closer to the estimates of the 
relative responses to interest rate changes.  
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Appendix E – Data 
Table E1 – Data  
Variable Source and transformation for the US Source and transformation for the UK 
Real GDP Monthly GDP from Macroeconomic 
Advisers; Expressed in natural logarithm 
Monthly GDP from Mitchell et al  
(2001); Expressed in natural logarithm 
CPI Monthly seasonally adjusted Consumer 
Price Index for all items from FRED 
(CPIAUCSL); Expressed in natural 
logarithm 
Monthly Seasonally adjusted CPI from the 
Bank of England database; Expressed in 
natural logarithm 
Asset purchase 
announcements 
Minutes of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC); Scaled by 
annualised 2009Q1 GDP 
Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC); Scaled by annualised 2009Q1 GDP 
5-year/10-year/20-year/30-
year yield on government 
bonds 
Monthly average of the 5/10/20/30 - year 
Yield on US Treasury Bonds taken from 
DataStream (USBD5/10/20/30Y) 
Monthly average of the 5/10/20/30 -year 
Yield on UK Gilts taken from the Bank of 
England website 
Real share prices Monthly average of S&P500 index from 
DataStream (S&PCOMP), divided by CPI 
and expressed in natural logarithms 
Monthly average of FTSE100 index from 
DataStream (FTSE100), divided by CPI and 
expressed in natural logarithms 
6m/12m/24m OIS rate Monthly average of option (swaption) value for the 3-month US Dollar/ UK Pound OIS 
(Overnight index Swap) rate 6 and 12 (24) months ahead from Bloomberg 
VIX Monthly average of the CBOE Volatility 
Index taken from FRED 
Monthly average of the implied volatility of 
the FTSE 100 taken from the Bank of 
England database 
MOVE Monthly average of the implied volatility index for interest rate swaptions. Constructed 
by assigning a weight of .2/.2/.4/.2 to the implied volatilities of the one month USD/GBP 
LIBOR rate 2 years/ 5 years/ 10 years and 30 years ahead, taken from Bloomberg. 
Household Uncertainty Monthly fraction of households of 
households citing future uncertainty as a 
reason for why today is a bad time to buy 
Fraction of GFK survey respondents 
indicating that uncertainty about the future 
affects consumer purchases. 
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large durables, taken from the University 
of Michigan Survey of Consumers. 
Government budget balance 
to GDP Ratio 
US/UK GOVERNMENT PRIMARY BALANCE AS % OF GDP (AR) SADJ is taken from 
the OECD Economic Outlook database at quarterly frequency and then linearly 
interpolated to monthly frequency. 
Public debt to GDP Ratio Total Public Debt as Percent of Gross 
Domestic Product from FRED ( 
GFDEGDQ188S) obtained at quarterly 
frequency, then linearly interpolated to 
monthly frequency. 
General government consolidated gross 
debt had been taken from the UK Office of 
National Statistics (BKPX) at quarterly 
frequency. The series is then seasonally 
adjusted via X12. This is then divided by 
annualised UK nominal GDP at quarterly 
frequency. The resulting ratio is linearly 
interpolated to monthly frequency 
Euro Area Spread Defined as the difference in yields on 10-year government debt between Italy and 
Germany. Monthly averages of daily yields have been obtained from DataStream 
(ITBRYLD/GBBD10Y) 
 
Real Oi9l Prices Crude Oil Prices: West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI) from FRED (MCOILWTICO); 
Deflated by CPI and expressed in natural 
logarithms. 
Crude Oil Prices: Brent Europe from 
FRED (MCOILBRENTEU); Deflated by 
CPI and expressed in natural logarithms 
ECB Balance Sheet Monthly average of Total Assets of the ECB, taken from the ECB Statistical 
Warehouse. Then expressed as a ratio to 2009Q1 Euro Area GDP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
